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First World or Fourth World?
When impressed with those stunning numbers of China"s growth, people tend to forget or ignore some important facts about China"s economy. First is the size of its population, a serious drawback on any progress the country has endeavored to achieve. There is a saying in China depicting the nation"s plight: Any achievement divided by 1.3 billion is nothing; any problem times 1.3 billion is overwhelming. Therefore, if we look at the global comparison of GDP per capita, China"s place ($5,300, ppp, 2007 est.) nosedives to 131 out of 230 economies. decades ago, the poverty and backwardness of the country was stunning and beyond imagination. Back in 1978, 250 million people, or one third of rural population in China lived in the "absolute poverty" (Chinese standard equal to under $0.25 per day). Thanks to the economic development and the tremendous efforts by the Chinese government, impressive progress has been made in reducing poverty in China. Yet, by 2006 statistics, there are still 21 million people living in such horrible misery. 3 If measured by international poverty standard (under $1 per day), then in 1990, even 12 years after China"s takeoff, 490 million or 40% of the total Chinese population fell below the poverty line. Today, this figure has been reduced to 130 million. 4 China still has the second largest population in poverty in the world, only next to India. Has anyone seen a superpower with so many of its people so poor?
The third is the extreme imbalance in development between China"s coastal/urban and interior/rural areas. Most foreign visitors toured Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou in China and went back with the impression that China has elevated itself into the First World -a developed country already. Yet, one doesn"t has to go far from the city limit, only a hundred miles away from some major cities into the countryside, to see the stunning poverty usually found not in the Third World, but in the Fourth World, that is, in the least developed country. According to the latest Chinese official statistics, the GDP of three Eastern coastal areas (the Zhujiang Delta centered in Canton, the Yangtse Delta centered in Shanghai, and the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei economic circle) counts for half of the national total, leaving the rest of the country to share the other half. 5 Provincially speaking, Canton"s GDP in 2003 was 3 times of Hunan, 10 times of Guizhou, 35 times of Qinghai, and 74 times of Tibet. 6 Economist Hu Angang divides China into "four worlds" according to the World Bank grouping of countries by income per capita: only 5% of Chinese population in the East coast live in the First World (above the higher-mid-income line of $8320 ppp), 20% in the Second World (above the lower-mid-income line of $3960 ppp), 25% in the Third World (above the low-income line of $1790), and the rest 50%, or 630 million people, live in the Fourth World (below the low-income line).
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Growth Sustainable? In addition to those apparent difficulties on surface, there are even deeper and harder-to-crack structural problems that may turn out to be fatal to the sustainability of China"s economic growth. First, China"s development has mainly been quantitative expansion so far, or increase in the size of the economy, rather than qualitative growth, or advancement in technology and productivity. Despite fast growth in total output, China"s industrial productivity remains low. In 2004, China"s overall productivity is only 1/9 of the US, 1/6 of Japan and 1/4 of South Korea, and was ranked 3 Various Chinese official statistics on poverty and development. While China is making great progress to catch up, the gap is just too wide to fill any time soon. Part of the major reasons for this low productivity are the labor-intensive and low-technology features of Chinese economy, as well as the lack of technological innovation. Of all the patents granted by Chinese authority three quarters are those owned by foreign business. In the past five years, the total patents granted to the top 10 Chinese electronic information enterprises are the same as the grants IBM has got alone in only one year. 9 Second, the over-consumption of energy and excessive environment pollution are the two chokepoints that seriously imperil the sustainability of China"s economic growth. With particularly low energy efficiency, China"s industries consume much more energy for the same output than most other countries (ranked no. 51 in the world), for instance, three times more than the US and 6.6 times more than Japan. China has been drastically increasing its dependence on import oil, putting pressure on the already stressed world market. In the meanwhile, China has been developing at the expense of environment protection. China"s carbon dioxide emission for each million dollar GDP was 12 times higher than Japan, 5 times higher than the US, and was ranked 57 out of 60 economies. 10 In 2007, China has surpassed the US to be the number one emitter in the world. 11 The severe air pollution causes up to 750,000 premature deaths each year.
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Third, China"s economic development has also been seriously distorted in terms of its fast growing and extremely high foreign trade dependency. The dependency rate shot up from 9.8% in 1978 to 50% in 2002, and then went on to 76% in 2005, reaching a level higher than most major trading powers, such as the U.S. (28%), Japan (31%), India (40%), Russia (56%), Britain (64%), only lower than Germany (85%). 13 Not only foreign trade accounts for such a big portion of its GDP, but China has also maintained huge trade surplus year after year. Such a high foreign trade dependency exposes China to volatile foreign markets full of uncertainties influenced not only by economic factors but also by political and diplomatic relations, whereas a trade surplus as high as what China enjoys currently simply cannot go on for long. A healthy and sustainable economy must be based on solid domestic demand, which in China has never been strong ever since the economic reform. Currently the problem is not so acute because the domestic market has been boosted by the two pillars of house construction and automobile manufacturing. Yet the market for these durable goods will be saturated before long, and then the problem of weak domestic demand will emerge as a major bottleneck for further growth. Due to all the adverse factors discussed above, despite its impressive economic growth, China"s international position of competitiveness among about 120 economies ranked by the World Economic Forum (Davos) has slipped year after year, from 33th (2002) 14 Another problem critical to China"s continuous economic growth is not purely economic yet closely related to the economic development -the problem of social stability. In the last three decades, China"s national wealth and average personal income has increased by 12 times. Unfortunately, instead of making everyone better off and happy, a significant portion of the populace has been more or less left out in the cold and become increasingly resentful against the current social-economic system, due to highly lopsided distribution of the newly acquired national wealth. According to statistics of various sources, China"s Gini coefficient rose from 0.16 in 1978 to 0.496 in 2006, exceeding the international alarm line of 0.4 as early as 2000. It is now higher than most countries in the world except in Latin America. In 1985, the ratio of urban/rural income per capita was 1.85:1, and then it went up to 3.24:1 in 2005 while the East/West ratio of income per capita was 2:22:1 in 1978 but 3:01:1 in 2001. Nowadays in China, the richest 20% families get 50.24% of national income, whereas the poorest 20% get only 4.66%. The richest 0.4% families own 70% of national wealth. 15 Tens of millions of workers lost their job from public-turned-private enterprises, and 150 millions peasants left their village to become migrant workers chasing any odd jobs they can find across the country. These two portions of the population, plus the poorest peasants in the rural area, form the bottom layer of the society. They don"t have stable jobs, they don"t have social security, and they don"t have medical insurance -in short, they have nothing and they are the most vulnerable to any economic downturn. This huge reserve of unemployed labor does help the economy greatly by keeping down the labor cost, yet in the meanwhile China"s economy is sitting on this huge power barrel waiting to explode at anytime. I want to make it clear that the foregoing presentation of China"s economic situation is one-sided, focusing almost exclusively on its negative aspects. And it is intentionally so in order to counterweigh the over-optimism of so many who glue their eyes on the sensational achievements by China and cannot wait to hail the birth of another superpower. The facts and data presented above are nevertheless true and reliable, meant to serve as a reminder that there is still a long way to go with many obstacles to overcome before China would become a true superpower. There are so many uncertainties out there that the prospect has to be discounted significantly.
To be a superpower requires not only hard power but soft power too. Hard power consists of economic and military strength, in addition to national endowment such as population, territory, and natural recourses. Among all these variables, economy is the most dynamic and critical one, and that"s why this paper limits its discussion of hard power to economic factors. I leave the military aspect out for two reasons: first, in general, military strength is just a function of the economy, when the later grows the former follows (Japan and Germany are all exceptions owing to the extraordinary postwar arrangement); second, the value of assessing Chinese military power by amateurs/outsiders is dubious due to the lack of reliable data, which is in turn due to the lack of transparency of the Chinese military. Aside from the hard power, however, there is a different kind of power, the soft power, that is indispensable for being a great power. In the following paragraphs I will consider some major deficiencies in China"s soft power which remain roadblock for China"s march toward superpower status.
Soft Power
If China is still far from becoming a superpower in terms of its hard power, then it is even further away in terms of soft power. First of all, China does not have an ideology, which is an indispensable qualification for a superpower. French Prime Minister Sarkozy once said, a country without an ideology to export cannot be a great power. China not only lacks an ideology for export, it doesn"t have one even for domestic consumption.
Marxism has long been abandoned not only by the people but also by the Communist Party itself, which keeps its name only for the sake of legitimacy. While in reality the Chinese Communist Party has ironically made Chinese society more capitalist than most Western nations (in terms of capital/management being more powerful than workers, and the lack of social welfare, etc.), the ruling party is not ready to openly and wholeheartedly embrace Western ideologycapitalism, democracy, and human rights. Thus in the past several decades, 1.3 billion Chinese should have been living in a spiritual vacuum with neither the guidance of any national ideology nor a value system based on mainstream consensus. It is hard to believe but the fact in today"s China is that people in general have no beliefs, except the popular motto "get rich fast". The traditional values have been thoroughly destroyed under the first thirty years of Communist rule, especially by the so-called "Cultural Revolution", whereas the new ones have never been up working. This is why Chinese society is also in the status "moral and ethical vacuum", as the subtitle in a major article appeared in the latest issue of Chinese Newsweek suggests. 16 And this is also why today"s China looks like the "wild, wild West" where anything goes. The lack of appealing ideology or value system not only disqualifies China from becoming a superpower but, worse and more gravely, poses a real danger to its national unity -which is an index of national strength. In a country like China, so vast in territory and so diverse in ethnicity and cultural background, it"s definitely necessary for the nation to have something in common to hold the country together -such as the belief system known as the American Creed serving as a spiritual bind for the American Nation. Without such a bind, the national unity and hence the national survival is in peril, let alone its attempt to become stronger and more powerful. Without an appealing ideology, a superpower would-be will not be able to justify its dominance, to make its influence acceptable to the rest of the world, and to find followers for its leadership.
China not only doesn"t have an ideology, it doesn"t have an international strategy either, which is also an indispensable component of superpower qualification. Since early 1990s, Chinese government has put forward a platform called "Peace and Development -Theme of Contemporary World" which after years of modification has now taken the form of "Harmonious World Thesis." A mixture of foreign policy philosophy and strategic overview, it argues that peace, development and cooperation have become the main theme of our era, and holds that in order to promote a "harmonious world" featuring political multipolarization and economic globalization, China should strive for the realization of equality, democracy, and legality in political arena, mutual trust, dialogue, and cooperation in security arena, mutual-benefit and win-win situation in economic arena, and diversity and tolerance in cultural arena. It is obvious that such a program is nothing more than rhetoric spiced with Wilsonian idealism which has little relevance to the real world today and hence little value for a global strategy for a big power. No wonder a major Chinese scholar/official has called for the making of a grand strategy for China"s foreign relations, pointing out that there has not been a comprehensive and systematic international strategic design ever since Mao"s Theory of Three Worlds.
As "Harmonious World" is too lofty and too far from reality to guide China"s foreign relations, China has in the past decades actually followed Deng Xiaoping"s teaching of two "never"s" ("Never be the head" [of any group] and "Never uphold the red banner" ) and his famous axiom "hide capacity and bide time." As a consequence, China has abandoned all the principles it once upheld under Mao"s highly ideological foreign policies, surrendered all the causes it once fought in the name of anti-imperialism and anti-hegemonism, given up the leadership as well as its followers of the Third World. China has become so eager to avoid trouble and conflict in which its national interests are not directly involved that as a permanent member of the UN Security Council it has cast the most abstention vote and the least veto vote among the big five in the past three decades. Thus, China"s pursuit of a foreign policy with no principle, no vision, no cause and no friends plus its relentless going after economic ties and benefits around the world, leave an impression in the eyes of the rest of the world a mercantilist nouveau riche. Such image works right against any prospect that China is to be accepted by the international community as a new comer of world power.
To sum up, even China has stunned the world with its marvelous economic achievement, the inherent weakness in its social-economic structure makes slim the likelihood of China becoming a superpower in the near future. Moreover, the deficiency in its soft power -in a sense even harder to catch up -makes the prospect even dimmer. However, low probability does not equate improbability. Let"s assume, for the sake of argument, that one day someone waves a magic wand and boom! In front of the world stands this new giant, China the superpower. Then what?
China the Superpower: A Threat to the US?
Many good-intentioned people who want to see US-China relations improve rather than deteriorate have argued fiercely against the claim that China will become a threat to the US when it grows into a superpower. And one argument they hold is that China would never engage the U.S. in a rivalry for dominance, regional or global, even when it gained strategic parity with the latter. Starting from Mao Zedong, generation after generation of Chinese top leaders have repeatedly vowed "China will never pursue hegemony -not even when we become strong and powerful," signaling the US that China will never challenge the US hegemony. Like all the people closely associated with both countries, I do not like to see tension rising in between China and the United States either. Yet, to be loyal to my professional conviction, I have to tell the truth as I see it.
Security Dilemma
The truth is, when China becomes a superpower, it automatically poses a threat to the United States. According to a realist law of international politics that has been borne out by human history, a nation"s external behavior and its relations to other nations (including whether posing a threat or not) is mainly determined by its capacity, i.e. its international power position, and not by its intension. And this is what security dilemma is all about. No matter how many theories of neoliberalism and constructivism have been put forward, and no matter how many international institutions and regimes have been installed, this millennia-old puzzle has remained unsolved while our world is still infested by spiraling arms race.
Last May, a debate on exactly the same topic I am discussing here -Does a booming China spell trouble for the US? --was held at the Asia Society in New York City which was broadcast live on PBS nationwide and later on YouTube. Upon reading the manuscript, while emotionally my sympathy goes to the "con" panelists who argued that China will not be a threat to the US, I cannot but find the "pro" argument to the contrary made by Professor John Mearsheimer more compelling, although I also believe he had a wrong prescription for the correct diagnosis.
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Measheimer said was axiomatically true for most if not all realists: In the self-help system of international anarchy -which in his figurative words is like making a 911 call with no one on the other end of the line -the narrower the capability gap between the leading power and the secondary power, the less secure the leading power. The possibility that nations like Canada or Mexico may harm the US, he speculates, is close to nonexistence whereas the likelihood of powers such as former Soviet Union or future China if it can keep its growth to inflict harm on the US is not only real but also high. And the reason is simple: for the latter, the capability to do harm is there ready to be employed, all you need is the intention. Speaking of intention, Mearsheimer went on to argue, there is no way to discern China"s intention 10 years or 30 years down the road, but if one looks at what the US has done since after it became a superpower, it won"t be hard to figure out what the Chinese will be up to in the future.
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He is right again on this. As I point out in my criticism of China"s official foreign policy philosophy, 20 Chinese leaders" repeated pledge not to pursue hegemony even when China gets powerful is completely worthless. It runs right against the grain of historical materialism (still part of the official dogma in China) which holds that material basis determines the superstructure (ideology, political and legal institutions, and policies, etc.) and against the essence of realism of international relations which holds power position of a nation constrains its external behavior. Hegemony (behavior or policies) is but an expression of the unmatched power the hegemon possesses. Shunning hegemonic behavior is only because the nation"s strength has not been strong enough. Once the strength is there, so will follow the behavior This is an objective law that is not to hinge on men"s will. A superpower may pursue hegemony wittingly or unwittingly, which may take the form of "Manifest Destiny" or "Proletariat International Obligations", or it may as well take the form of "Harmonious World." The Chinese leaders have been too eager to show the world they have no intention whatsoever to dominate the region or the world regardless, only to arouse suspicion by other nations because this is like writing a check that is highly unlikely to be honored.
Wrong Prescription
While getting the diagnosis right, Mearsheimer wrote the wrong prescription for the US. If China is going to be a threat to the US anyway, what should the US do? "(T)he best way … is to make sure that you are by far the most powerful state in the international system." Or, again in his vivid language, "you want to be the biggest and baddest dude on the block, so that nobody fools around with you." OK, but how? Like reacting to all other rising powers in history that were up to vying for dominance with the US, such as Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and the former Soviet Union, Mearsheimer declares that "We go to great lengths to stop them." 21 There is one problem though with this prescription. When China grows into a great power, it is true that it will post a threat to the US -and vice versa (Actually it goes without saying that the US as the world"s sole superpower has always been the greatest threat to the peace and security of all other nations). Yet a threat is a potential harm and not a real one. To turn the potential into reality requires one more factor -the hostility between the two powers. "To stop them" -it"s one thing that the US would succeed in so doing, it"s quite anther should it try but fail. Then it should be prepared to face the worst case scenario -the worst combination of having a rising power and a hostile rival.
Mitigating Factors: Chinese Characteristics
It would be nice from the US standpoint to stop China from being a threat and a rival but it would not be easy. The US stopped Germany (twice) and Japan through world wars, but it"s hard to imagine a war between two nuclear powers as a rational choice of strategy. The Soviet Union was stopped not by the United States, to the misperception of most Americans, but by a renegade from within. The similar collapse occurring in China is indeed possible, and even probable thanks to the Western efforts led by the US under the banner of "Peaceful Evolution." Yet it would be too opportunistic and imprudent to put all the hope for future US security completely in the self-annihilation of the anticipated danger. Does that mean, then, the prospect of the US security looks quite grim? Not necessarily. As mentioned at the beginning of this essay, in addition to the power position of a country, there are other factors on the national level that affect its external behavior -for example the national characters rooted in the nation"s history and culture. Structural realism tells us, as a rule, a state"s external behavior is by and large determined by its power position in the international system. The theory doesn"t take into consideration unit level variables such as national characters or domestic politics, not because it denies the importance of these variables -how could any sensible IR theory do so? -but because of the lack of regularities in their impact on state behavior which makes it impossible to integrate them into theory of international politics. When it comes down to foreign policy studies, however, these variables become indispensably important and are brought back to the equation. In our current case, although China"s great power status will automatically pose a threat to the US, how "clear and present" the danger would be will depend on how good or bad the bilateral relationship would be and on how strong an ambition China would have to rival with the US for domination. These two variables leave much room for the US to maneuver which may make quite a difference.
Best Time for Sino-US relations?
In general bilateral relations depend on both sides -their interactive attitudes and policies. In Sino-US relations, however, United States has been the leading party more responsible for where the relationship heads to. Looking back at the recent history of Sino-US relations since 1970s, a pattern based on two observations can be easily discerned: Number one, the United States has mostly if not always been the active party who takes the initiative to set agenda, raise issues, and put forth demands, whereas China usually takes the passive role of following, responding, and accommodating; number two, the United States has mostly if not always been the aggressive party who uses high-handed tactics to pressure the Chinese government into concession, whereas China usually takes the defensive role to compromise and appease. Among disputes the two countries have had in the past decades, a significant part focuses on human rights and trade issues (including intellectual property rights) with a pattern in which the US made accusations and demands while Chinese officials scrambled for explanations and self-defenses before finally going at least halfway to meet American requirements to save the relationship. Another major part of the disputes involves Taiwan where the pattern goes as follows: the US usually takes initiative in action (arms sales in most cases, or allowing Taiwan leaders into the US) to which the Chinese government would protest and react with diplomatic or military postures (against Taiwan) only to no avail.
It is not unfair to say, therefore, that most tensions in Sino-US relations in the past decades were caused by the US side. Not only China was not the one who caused the trouble, but its patience and tolerance toward US provocation has been remarkable. Many actions the US took against China have far exceeded what inter-state relations can normally tolerate. The political support and military protection as well as the numerous arms sales rendered to Taiwan not only violate the sovereignty of China but also infringe the treaty-like communiqués between the two countries. The US not only imposes on China strict embargo of high-tech and military products but also goes to extra length to prevent other nations from selling arms to China. It went as far as forcing Israel to cancel signed contract to sell AWACS airborne pre-warning system to China, and to detain the Falcon surveillance planes China had already bought and used but sent back for maintenance. The US has provided shelter and support for all kinds of anti-Chinese Government forces ranging from democratic movement organizations, to separatist groups from Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang and other parts of China, to Falungong and even terrorist group such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement. For a number of times, the US authorities have moved in to prevent Chinese business from acquiring American companies or their interests by the excuse of protecting US national security, despite all the purchases remaining within the normal limit of market activities. Had China done any of those things reversely to the US, there is no doubt that the US would have considered it an action of war and responded correspondingly. But China did not. To the contrary, in recent years China has joined some high ranking American officials to depict US-China relations as having "the best time in three decades," showing satisfaction rather than resentment.
To be sure, China"s "softness" toward the US may well be explained by its lack of "position of strength" which the US nevertheless enjoys. Yet if one looks at the way China handled the territorial disputes in the South China Sea in recent decades in which Chinese fishing boats were often bombarded and/or detained by the navy of neighboring nations, one may find, curiously, that the pattern is not China the big guy bullying over the smaller ones but just the opposite. This phenomenon should lead people to think about factors not on surface related to national power but deep down at the philosophical level that may help configure China"s external behavior.
Ever since Confucian, mainstream Chinese philosophies have emphasized the ideas of 和 and 合，two different characters with the same pronunciation "he" (as in her), and that"s why the Chinese culture is sometimes called "he-he" culture. The first "he" means peace, mild, kind, and harmony, whereas the second "he" means join, combine, together, inclusion. As the two concepts suggest, Chinese philosophies cherish the values that are very different from what the prevailing Western philosophies do. For instance, while competition is taken a good thing for social/economic progress and "survival of the fittest" a natural law in Western cultures and social norms, the "he-he" culture instead teaches "peace/cooperation is the most precious in the world" and preaches egalitarianism. While the American "tough-guy" culture admires heroes who are strong and tough, the Chinese "he-he" culture sympathizes with people who are weak and soft. While the former champions the virtues of power, struggle and prevalence, the latter advocates the value of endurance, reconciliation and compromise. While the former sees conflict a normal part of social life through which one upholds ones values and interests, the latter deems it an evil that should be avoided at any price. Therefore in Chinese classical literature there are tons of maxim teaching people to shun conflict, such as "stoop to compromise," "take misfortune as fortune," "take humiliation and swallow anger," and so on. With everlasting indoctrination as such, the inclination of conflict-avoiding and compromise-making has become a national characteristic of the Chinese nation when confronted by other nations. Judging from Chinese history and culture, and the history of China"s foreign relations in particular, I find it hard to imagine that China would be the one to cause hostility in future Sino-US relations unless it is deliberately provoked. It is my expectation, therefore, that only if the US could treat China with some more respect for its national sovereignty, and on the basis of equality instead of tutelage, Sino-US relations are bound to improve as time passes. And the better relationship the US has with China, the less threat it would feel from the great power status China is anticipated to attain, just as it doesn"t feel much threatened by its Western European allies.
What's good for goose is good for gander?
In speculating the strategic goal China will pursue upon growing into a great power, Professor Mearsheimer used this proverb he as a boy learned from his mother to predict that like the United States and all other great powers in history, China would seek dominance of its own, first in Asia and then globally, and hence become a threat to the US hegemony. In some previous passages of this essay I took the position to endorse this realist argument. I could have enlisted a Chinese proverb to strike the point home: Just like "The ditch follows where the water flows through," hegemony arises where superpower grows. This is a general rule in international politics. Having said that, though, I must pose the caveat right away: There may be exceptions to the rule, or at least there are factors that may weaken -not invalidate -the rule by mitigating the intensity with which the newly grown superpower pursues dominance.
And one of such factors is the ambition to dominate. Believe it or not, just like not all individuals want to be number one, not all nations have the same ambition to dominate the region/world. Again, it has something to do with the nation"s history and culture. In Chinese history there was a mysterious anomaly that flies in the face of the general rule about human nature in pursuing dominance: At the beginning of the 15 th century when China was the superpower of the world, a huge Chinese fleet equipped with the most advanced technology in ship-building and the most modern navigation know-how at the time launched an exploration of the world with eight expeditions into the West Pacific and the Indian Ocean in a span of three decades, reaching the land of dozens of countries today and as far as East Africa. Just at a moment when China had the best chance to expand its rule and build a huge empire in this vast area, to the surprise and puzzlement of historians, the Chinese emperor ordered the burning of all Chinese fleet and banned all ocean-going voyages from then on. China had since turned inward until its door was bombarded open by the gunboats of Western powers 300 hundred years later. The lack of interest in domination on the part of China can also be discerned in another unique phenomenon in Chinese history -the Tributary State System where imperial China did not seek actual control of its tributaries but only nominal submission -to show respect only. This kind of "inward" mentality and disinterest in expansion of territory or influence has to do with a stream of traditional wisdom in Chinese culture. Unlike Western norms that encourage outgoing enterprise and pioneer spirit that knows no limit, one major virtue enshrined in Chinese philosophical classics has been "complacence." For example, Lao Tzu revealed that "No humiliation for those who know satisfaction; no peril for those who know quitting," 22 whereas another Han Dynasty classic had this famous teaching "Wealth lies in complacence while nobility lies in retreat." 23 And the proverb adds: "Always happy the contended." One should stay complacent and keep a low profile because it is just too risky to seek prominence in a world full of danger, against which too many maxims warned in lines such as "the bird sticking its head out gets shot," "big tree gets more wind," (one Chinese-English Dictionary translate the idiom this way: "A person of high position is liable to be attacked.") and "doomed the pig gaining weight, doomed the man gaining fame," etc. Remember Deng Xiaoping"s famous warning for Chinese foreign policy? "Never be the head (of any group)!" Does he sound just another ancient sage? The Chinese may simply not like domination so much as There is no way to tell what kind of mentality the Chinese would be in when their country grew into a superpower -if they would still stay comfortably with their cultural heritage or if they would have abandoned it for the modern Western (American) philosophy of "go get it." With the philosophical genes of being modest and moderate in the nation"s blood, however, the chances are that China would not choose to be a radical challenger to the status quo and to the American hegemony but rather a responsible stakeholder of the current international order, as Americans have expected it to be and as it has actually been so far, or an incremental reformer at most in the future when the time is ripe. But all this prediction has one premise and that"s the current hegemon the United States will maintain the relative fairness or the legitimacy of the current system. Should the US stack the cards in order to stop China"s rise, China might be forced into the role of a challenger rather than a stakeholder.
Conclusion
China is rising. There is a chance that one day it would grow into a superpower and pose a threat to the US. How grave this threat would be depends on two variables: one the status of Sino-US relations and the other China"s position toward current international order. The US does have the choice of trying to stop China"s development, but the risk is just too high: if failed the US would face a hostile rival determined to challenge the status quo. The US also has the choice of letting China"s rise play itself out while keeping US-China relations manageable if not friendly and keeping US hegemony legitimate and fair, so if and when China does grow into a superpower, the threat it poses would be minimized. # 
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